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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
As opposed to the unitary form of government established by the Constitutions that were 
adopted by successive government of the Ethiopian state,1 the present Constitution has 
ushered in a new dispensation by declaring a federal form of government. 2  The Constitution 
of the Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter, the FDRE Constitution) has 
established a two-order government: Federal and State Governments.3 Each order of 
government has its own exclusive powers in certain areas4 while sharing powers in other 
areas.5 This presents a fertile ground for intergovernmental relations. However, the problem 
is that the Constitution as well as the legal system have not given sufficient attention to the 
regulation of intergovernmental relations between the two orders of government. This work 
will be concerned with a particular aspect of this problem. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Establishing different orders of government implies not only division of powers between the 
different levels of government but also adopting a framework through which the relationship 
between the different orders of government6 is regulated. In the absence of such frame work, 
dispute, competition, and lack of flow of information between and among the different orders 
                                                            
1Habib 2004, available at 
http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/The%20role%20of%20the%20House%20in%20EFDRE%20constition.pdf, 
accessed on 19/05/08. 
2 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution, hereinafter), Art.1.            
3 FDRE Constitution, Art.50 (1). 
4 FDRE Constitution, Arts 51 & 96 for the Federal Government, and Arts.52 & 97 for the State Governments. 
5 FDRE Constitution, Art. 98. 
6 This relationship is known as intergovernmental relations. See Department of Provincial and Local 
Government Republic of South Africa (DPLG) 2007, 1. 
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of governments will prevail.7 Such situations hinder the different orders of government from 
discharging their responsibilities as public institutions.  
 
As mentioned above, although Ethiopia has adopted federal form of government since 1995, 8 
it has not adequately dealt with matters of policy and legislative frameworks that are 
supposed to breathe life into the system. This includes intergovernmental relations. As a 
result, the system is facing problems related to information flow and oversight of the 
implementations of laws and policies at state level. It is only in 2005 that the Federal 
Government started to pay attention to issues of intergovernmental relations. 9  
 
The Ethiopian federal system of government especially suffers from a lack of constitutionally 
or legislatively sanctioned clear and structured system of supervision. Put simply, supervision 
represents an act of monitoring and intervention. It is an aspect of intergovernmental relations 
whereby one order of government oversees the act of another and intervenes in case of failure 
to fulfill particular obligations. Of course, the autonomy of subnational units must be 
guaranteed. The concept of autonomy should not, however, be protected to the extent that it 
compromises the objectives of the federal system. In emerging federations like Ethiopia, 
endowing the national government with supervisory powers is essential and hence this aspect 
of intergovernmental relations should be given due consideration.10 This is mainly because 
the centre is where most important laws and policies are made and often plays significant role 
in strengthening the federation.11 The subnational units in Ethiopia, which are referred to by 
the Constitution as regions, are not, at least some of them, in a position to discharge their 
Constitutional obligations in their respective jurisdictions. This says that the Federal 
Government must have at its disposal a means by which it can ensure the effective 
                                                            
7 DPLG 2007, 3. 
8 It adopted a Constitution that establishes federal state structure in 1995. See the FDRE Constitution, Art.1.  
9 Proclamation No. 359/2003, Art.21 (6). 
10 Work 2002, 5-6, available at http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/DLGUD_Pub_overview-decentralisation-
worldwide-paper.pdf, accessed on 03/08/08. 
11 FDRE Constitution, Art.51. 
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implementation of laws, the provision of effective service delivery and effective governance 
in regions. 
 
In addition, supervisory role should not be regarded as undesired element in Ethiopian 
federalism. It is by no means against regional autonomy if properly entrenched under the 
Constitution. Supervision is even said to be an incentive for effective decentralization.12 
Therefore, Ethiopia by clearly dealing with the supervisory role of the centre can strengthen 
its decentralization process. 
 
In this research, an attempt will be made to address the following problems.  
 
First, the Constitution mandates regional Governments to implement federal laws.13 This 
begs the following question: How can the Federal Government ensure that the regions have 
enforced these laws and policies? The FDRE Constitution does not provide for a mechanism 
to address this issue in a comprehensive manner. The Constitutional basis and/or extent of 
such supervisory power of the centre, if there is any, is not clear. In South Africa, the national 
government has a supervisory power that allows it to ensure that national laws are 
implemented by the provinces.14 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
(hereinafter, SA Constitution) clearly outlines the nature and extent of the supervisory role of 
the national government.15 The South African case provides a good example in terms of 
which to analyse the Ethiopian system. 
 
                                                            
12 De Visser 2005, 45. 
13 FDRE Constitution, Art.52 (2) (d). 
14 Simeon & Murray 2004, 290. 
15 Act 108 of 1996. 
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Second, one of the drawbacks of decentralization is regional imbalance.16 Decentralization 
increases inter-regional inequalities.17 However, a supervisory role by a national government 
can go a long way in mitigating this particular disadvantage of decentralization.18 Partly 
owing to the absence of a supervisory framework, Ethiopia is facing a growing problem of 
regional imbalance even more than a decade after the FDRE Constitution came into 
operation.19 
 
In addition, the intervention role that the centre is supposed to play in terms of the FDRE 
Constitution is not clear. Even in cases where this is provided, they represent reactions that 
are adopted after every thing went wrong. This shows that the FDRE Constitution focuses on 
correction rather than prevention. Moreover, supervision is employed for extreme cases only. 
The focus, it seems, is on intervention without monitoring. A supervisory role should have 
not only reactive element but also proactive element,20 something that is lacking in the 
Ethiopian Constitutional system.  
 
In this research I will address the following question: ‘what is the extent of supervisory 
power of the Federal Government of Ethiopia over the Regions?’ Among other things, I will 
deal with the following sub-questions:  
-Does the Federal Government have monitoring power over the Regional Governments? And 
-Does Federal Government play a supervisory role? 
 
In this research paper, I argue that the supervisory role of the centre as provided under the 
FDRE Constitution is insufficient. A more structured and elaborated approach to supervisory 
                                                            
16 De Visser 2005, 45. 
17 Miller 2002, 11. 
18 De Visser 2005, 45.  
19 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: The House of Federation 2007, 2.  
20 DPLG 1999, 24.   
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role of the centre is required in Ethiopia. I also argue that Ethiopia needs a defined 
supervisory role of the centre for effective federalism (federalism that serves objectives it is 
designed for). In addition, I argue that the supervisory framework adopted by the SA 
Constitution provides a good model for Ethiopia. 
 
1.3 Scope of the research 
It is no doubt that intergovernmental relations has various aspects. Dealing with all its aspect 
is beyond the object of this research. This research is limited only to the supervision aspect of 
intergovernmental relations. Therefore, it only deals with supervision, in general, and 
monitoring and intervention, in particular. Furthermore, it is limited only to the FDRE 
Constitution and the SA Constitution frameworks.   
 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study, among other things, are  
- to describe and analyse the supervision aspect of intergovernmental relation established by 
the FDRE Constitution and SA Constitution; 
- to show the gap under the provisions of the FDRE Constitution relating to the supervisory 
role of the centre on regions; and 
- to show that the South African experience of supervision presents a good example to 
Ethiopia. 
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study is an attempt to come up with a comprehensive study of the supervision aspect of 
intergovernmental relations as enshrined under the FDRE Constitution and the SA 
Constitution. It also helps to expose some of the problems supervisory relationship of 
different orders of government in Ethiopia and South Africa face. It is significant as it deals 
with the intergovernmental relations gap in the FDRE Constitution and draws attention to a 
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very important aspect of a multi-order government’s feature. It helps Ethiopia to learn from 
the experience of other countries. It suggests adjustments needed, in particular having regard 
to the relatively well developed national supervision system enshrined in the SA Constitution. 
Finally, the work adds upon studies relating to supervision by the centre of regions in African 
states. 
 
1.6 Overview of the chapters 
Chapter one outlines the problem statement and thesis. Chapter two provides for a short 
overview of the state structure and principles of intergovernmental relations as enshrined 
under the FDRE Constitution and the SA Constitution. Chapter three, by way of presenting 
the background for the discussions in the next chapter, discusses the concept of supervision 
under intergovernmental relations established by the SA Constitution. It thereby presents the 
parameters against which supervision under the FDRE Constitution is evaluated. Chapter four 
is primarily concerned with evaluating the system of supervision under the FDRE 
Constitution. Chapter five provides conclusion and recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
Constitutional Context of Supervision in Ethiopia and South Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses, very briefly, the Constitutional context of supervision in Ethiopia and 
South Africa. It provides for how power is divided between the centre and the subnational 
units or regions and provinces as they are called in Ethiopia and South Africa, respectively. It 
also shows the manner of intergovernmental relations and the basis of supervision in such 
relations. 
 
2.2 Ethiopia: Constitutional context of supervision 
A brief review of the Constitutional history of Ethiopia would reveal that the country had 
passed through the experience of three written Constitutions prior to the adoption of the 
FDRE Constitution, 1995. All the three written Constitutions of the previous regimes opted 
for a unitary state structure.21 This unitary tradition came to an end with the fall of the 
military regime, commonly known as the Derg, in 1991. A Transitional Government Charter 
(TGC), adopted in 1991, rejected the unitary option and embraced a system of government 
that is characterised by a great degree of devolution. 22 This was further affirmed by the series 
of ‘federally flavoured’ proclamations that were enacted by the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia. 23 Therefore, it would not be incorrect to say that the federal dispensation that is 
officially adopted under the FDRE Constitution is the follow up of the decentralisation 
process that was rolled out during the transitional period. It can also be argued that the TGC 
had established a roadmap to the establishment of the federal arrangement that is now in 
place in Ethiopia. In 1995, the TGC was replaced by the FDRE Constitution. 
 
                                                            
21 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Capacity Building (MCB) 2005, 7. 
22 Some writers say that federalism was introduced into Ethiopia in 1991. See Aalen 2002, 1. 
23 Morrison 1992, 129-130; Cohen 1994, 6. 
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The FDRE has officially established a federal state structure and declared Ethiopia to be a 
federal state.24 According to the Constitution, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
consists of Regional States and City Administrations.25 The City Administrations are under 
the Federal Government for any administrative matters and are directly accountable to it. The 
regions, on the other hand, administer themselves by Regional States Governments.26 As it is 
the case with many other federal Constitutions,27 the FDRE Constitution has allocated powers 
both to the Federal28 and Regional Governments.29 
 
2.2.1 Division of powers 
A look at the FDRE Constitution shows that government powers are divided into exclusive, 
residual, concurrent, delegated or undesignated powers. Each will be discussed below. 
 
2.2.1.1 Exclusive powers 
Exclusive powers refer to the powers specifically or exclusively given to either the Federal or 
the Regional Governments but not both.30 The competence lies only with the tier of 
government that is Constitutionally entrusted with the power unless lawfully delegated.31 The 
other level of government is prohibited from exercising and interfering into those powers.32 
                                                            
24 FDRE Constitution, Arts 1, 46 (1) & 50 (1). 
25 City Administrations are different from Regional Governments as they are under the direct control of the 
Federal Government.  See, FDRE Constitution, Arts 46(1), 47 (1) & 50 (1); Proclamation No.416/2004; 
Proclamation No.361/2003. 
26 FDRE Constitution, Arts 49(3) & 50 (2) (4); Proclamation No.416/2004, Art.15. It is important to note that 
the City Administrations or Councils have their on councillors elected by the people of the Cities. See MCB 
2005, 12. 
27 Elazar 1995, 15. 
28 Functional areas of City Administrations are determined by proclamations passed by the Federal Government. 
See Proclamation No.416/2004; Proclamation No.361/2003, Art.17. 
29 See FDRE Constitution, Arts 50 & 51.  
30 Steytler 2001, 242. 
31 Steytler 2001, 242. 
32 Steytler 2001, 242. 
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The exclusive powers of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Regions are stated 
under Articles 51 and 52 (2) of the FDRE Constitution respectively. This says that Regional 
Governments are autonomous with respect to those powers assigned to them and the Federal 
Government is prohibited from interfering with them.33 The border between federal and state 
powers is not always clear. For example, carving out exclusive powers is problematic as far 
as the ‘power to protect and defend the Federal Constitution’ is concerned as this power rests 
on both the Federal and Regional Governments.34 However, the writer believes that this 
power needs to be interpreted in such a way that it is exclusively given to the Regional 
Governments within their territory. Although, the Federal Government has the exclusive 
power to protect and defend the Constitution throughout the country, intervention should be 
allowed only in case a Region fails to discharge its Constitutional obligation in that respect. 
The whole concept will be discussed in chapter four. 
 
2.2.1.2 Residual powers 
Residual powers are powers that are ‘remaining’ and not mentioned under exclusive 
jurisdiction of one order of government.35 The FDRE Constitution bestows such powers on 
Regional Governments.36 This means that the Federal Government exercises only those 
powers that are expressly assigned to it.37 One may, however, argue that federal powers 
includes powers that are incidental to the powers expressly provided as it will be absurd to 
hold that the Federal Government has the powers expressly given to it but not powers 
necessary to exercise those same powers. 
 
 
                                                            
33 FDRE Constitution, Art.50 (8). 
34 FDRE Constitution, Arts 51(1) & 52 (2) (a). 
35 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2003. 
36 FDRE Constitution, Art.52 (1). 
37 Nahum 1997, 37. 
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2.2.1.3 Concurrent powers 
Concurrent powers are powers that can be exercised by different orders of governments 
simultaneously.38 The only concurrent power that the FDRE Constitution provides for relate 
to taxation, which is stipulated under Article 98. 
 
2.2.1.4 Delegated powers 
The Regions in Ethiopia exercise delegated powers, which are funded by the Federal 
Government.39 This reveals two important points about the FDRE Constitution. First, it 
allows the delegation of powers that are deemed to be appropriate to be exercised by Regions. 
Second, but it prohibits unfunded delegation of such powers. 
 
2.2.1.5 Undesignated powers 
Undesignated powers are powers that are not allocated to any order of government.40 They 
are different from residual powers as they are not left for Regions to exercise them. Rather, 
they are to be assigned either to the Federal or Regional governments upon a decision of the 
joint session of the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation.41 
 
2.3 Intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia 
Generally speaking, the FDRE Constitution does not adequately deal with intergovernmental 
relations between the Federal and Regional Governments. However, a close look at some of 
the provisions of the Constitution indicates to the existence of some conditions that call for 
intergovernmental relations between the two orders of government. It, for example, calls for 
cooperation of the two orders of governments in the areas of taxation under Article 100 of the 
                                                            
38 Steytler 2001, 241. 
39 FDRE Constitution, Arts 50 (9) and 94 (3). 
40 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Cambridge University Press 2003. 
41 FDRE Constitution, Art.99.  
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Constitution. It is only through cooperation and discussion that the two governments can 
avoid acts that may ‘adversely affect their relationship’ while exercising their taxation powers 
as distinct levels of government. But the way such cooperation should be conducted is not 
provided for. Considering that Ethiopia is new to federal form of government, a law that 
regulates such cooperation may be beneficial as it helps to clarify and strengthen such 
cooperation. This however, begs another question: Which order of government should enact 
laws that regulate such cooperation? The Federal Government or Regional governments? 
 
A simple reading of the FDRE Constitution might suggest that the Regional Governments 
have the power to enact such laws pursuant to the residual power entrusted to them. But this 
particular construction of the Constitution presents a significant problem because it allows for 
the existence of different laws by permitting each Regional Government to pass its own law. 
Existence of different laws further calls for various ways of cooperation as each region comes 
up with its own law. 
 
There is also possible argument based on the power of the Federal Government to protect the 
Constitution pursuant to Article 51 (1). The challenge in this argument is whether protection 
of the Constitution goes to the protection of the relationship created by the Constitution. 
 
The other provision under the FDRE Constitution that seems to provide condition for 
intergovernmental relations is Article 94 (2), which calls for federal support to emerging 
regions. It is limited in the form of relation and the organs to be regulated by it as it is about 
financial support and deals with part of the relation that may exist between the centre and 
emerging states only.  
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2.4 South Africa: Constitutional context of supervision 
The SA Constitution declares that the Republic of South Africa consists of Provincial, Local 
and National Governments.42 Although each sphere of Government has its own powers, the 
list of concurrent powers is very long. These powers are listed under Schedule 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution. The powers of the provincial and the national spheres of governments are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
2.4.1 Exclusive powers 
As stated above, exclusive power represents a power given to one sphere of government. 
Hence, the other sphere of government may not exercise them unless lawfully permitted in 
line with the Constitution. The National Government ‘has exclusive power in respect of all 
matters other than those specifically vested in provincial legislatures by the’ Constitution.43 
Similarly, the Provincial Government also has exclusive power on certain matters.44 
Generally speaking, however, exclusive powers do not appear prominent in the South African 
Constitution. The Constitution provides that the National Government has ‘power over 
almost all...matters, both listed and unlisted,’ hence it has little room for exclusive powers.45 
As far as provinces are concerned, the Constitution is characterised by its allocation of 
concurrent powers rather than allocating exclusive power to only one sphere of government.46  
 
 
                                                            
42 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (SA Constitution, hereinafter), Secs 40 & 41.   
43 See In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), 
para.256. 
44 SA Constitution, Sec.104 (b) (ii). This power includes power incidental thereto. See In re: Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, paras 244, 252 & 254.  It is, however, important to note that 
this argument is true only generally speaking. Exceptionally, the National Government may enact on the matters 
under Schedule 5 of the Constitution. Such exception is warranted where a national legislation is necessitated by 
any one or more of the reasons mentioned under SA Constitution, Section 44 (2). See also Steytler 2001, 242-
244; Steytler 1999, 300. Such powers are powers “necessary ‘for South Africa to speak with one voice, or to act 
as a single entity.’’’ See In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, paras 239-
240; SA Constitution, Sec.104 (b) (iv); De Visser 2005, 80; Steytler 2001, 242. 
45 Steytler 2001, 241. 
46 Steytler 2001, 241. 
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2.4.2 Residual powers 
Under the SA Constitution, residual powers are left for the National Government.47 This is 
inferred from the language of the Constitution.48 Hence, the National Government exercises 
powers that are not mentioned under either the concurrent list of Schedule 4 or 5.49 
 
2.4.3 Concurrent powers 
The CRSA provides that both the National and Provincial Governments have concurrent 
power over Schedule Four matters. However, the powers of both the national and provincial 
governments with respect to Part B of the same schedule are limited to making laws that set 
out general frame work and principles for local government and does not include the power 
to make detailed regulation of the matters provided thereof.50 
 
2.4.4 Delegated powers 
The CRSA provides that provinces may exercise delegated powers.51 It provides for a 
possibility of delegation of power by the National Government to the other spheres of 
governments.52 Hence, it is valid to say that provinces can exercise power on any matter 
‘expressly assigned to’ them ‘by national legislation.’53  
 
 
                                                            
47 SA Constitution, Secs 44 (1) (ii) & 164. See In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, para.244. 
48 Executive Council of the Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development et al 1996, (12) BCLR 1360 (CC), paras 25-28; See also De Visser 2005, 129-130. 
49 Steytler 2001, 241; SA Constitution, Secs 44 (1) (ii) & 146. 
50 De Visser 2005, 129-130. See the first statement of SA Constitution, Schedule 4, Part B. 
51 SA Constitution, Secs 104 (b)(iii), 164 & 44 (1) (iii). 
52 SA Constitution, Secs 104 (b)(iii), 164 & 44 (1) (iii). 
53 SA Constitution, Secs 104 (b)(iii), 164 & 44 (1) (iii). 
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2.5 Intergovernmental relations in South Africa 
The CRSA provides that the three ‘…spheres of government… are distinctive, interdependent 
and interrelated.’54 This Constitutional provision reveals a lot about the nature of the South 
African multi-order government. The ‘distinctiveness’ of the three orders of government 
refers to the autonomy each one of them enjoys while exercising its exclusive powers.55 In 
other words, ‘[d]istinctiveness lies in the provision made for elected governments at national, 
provincial and local levels.’56 Their ‘interdependence’ refers to the manner in which they 
should exercise their powers.57 It says that the three spheres of government should cooperate 
while exercising government power to the common good of the people of South Africa.58 
Their ‘interrelatedness’ refers to the supervision of one sphere of government by the other.59 
In the language of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, “[t]he interdependence and 
interrelatedness flow from the founding provision that South Africa is ‘one sovereign, 
democratic State.’60 These features of the South African government are further stressed by 
the principles of cooperative government under Section 41.   
 
The provisions under Chapter Three of the Constitution generally signify that 
intergovernmental relationship in South Africa is founded upon two bases.61 The first basis of 
the intergovernmental relationship is equality,62 i.e., equality of all spheres of government.63 
                                                            
54 SA Constitution, Sec.40 (1). 
55 Malan 2005, 227; Woolman et’al 2007, 14-8.   
56 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 382 (CC) 
para.50; Malan 2005, 227.  
57 Woolman  et’al 2007, 14-8. 
58 Woolman  et’al 2007, 14-8; Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and Others 
1999, para.50; Malan 2005, 227. 
59 Steytler 1995, available at http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/southAfricag1.pdf, 
accessed on 29/06/08. Others say that the ‘interdependence’ refers to the supervision element. See Malan 2005, 
227. 
60 Malan 2005, 227; Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and Others, 1999, 
para.50; SA Constitution, Sec.1. 
61 I am referring to the manners of conducting intergovernmental relationships. DPLG 1999, 24. 
62 Parallel or horizontal intergovernmental relations. DPLG 1999, 24. 
63 DPLG 1999, 24.  
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It deals with intergovernmental relation that is conducted on equal footings, i.e., each sphere 
of government enjoying or having the same status.64 It accords equal protection to each 
sphere of government.65 This can be seen from the components of cooperative government as 
explained in Section 41(1) of the Constitution.66  
 
The second basis of intergovernmental relationship is hierarchy, i.e., subordination of a 
particular sphere of government to one or the other.67 Intergovernmental relationship on such 
basis specifically refers to the supervision power of one sphere of government over the other 
as supervision in its essence refers to a hierarchical relationship.68 The supervising sphere is 
in most cases perceived as the superior sphere of government as it directs the other sphere of 
government what and how to do something.69 Supervision will be dealt with under the next 
chapter. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion shows that the FDRE Constitution and the SA Constitution provide 
for different orders of governments and assign powers to them. The former allocates more 
exclusive powers to regions than the latter. Though both Constitutions provide fertile ground 
for intergovernmental relations as they establish different orders of governments, it is only 
the SA Constitution that has adequately dealt with such relationship. Furthermore, the SA 
Constitution provides for intergovernmental relations through cooperation and supervision.  
But the FDRE Constitution does not deal with such relations. However, it does provide for 
                                                            
64 DPLG 1999, 24. It can also be said that having ‘the same guarantees of preservation.’ Baldi, Beyond the 
Federal-Unitary Dichotomy, p. 4, available at http://igs.berkeley.edu/publications/working_papers/99-7.pdf, 
accessed on 30/05/08.   
65 DPLG 1999, 24.    
66 See SA Constitution, Sec.41 (1). 
67 DPLG 1999, 23-24. It is a kind of ‘vertical’ intergovernmental relationships. 
68 DPLG 1999, 23-24.  
69 This may seem unacceptable in relation to the supervision of provinces on the National Assembly through 
NCOP. Therefore, this situation may be taken as an exception to the general rule or uniqueness of South African 
legal system. 
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the concept of supervision (See chapter four). Supervision under the FDRE Constitution and 
the SA Constitution will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Supervision of Provinces by the National Government in South Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the manner and extent of the supervisory power of the National 
Government of South Africa over the provinces (national supervision hereinafter). The 
discussion covers the meaning, nature and rationale of supervision under the SA Constitution, 
1996. It provides that supervision includes acts of monitoring and intervention. Furthermore, 
it provides that though the SA Constitution has dealt with intervention clearly and to a 
reasonable extent, monitoring is said to be an implied power and not dealt with. 
 
3.2 Meaning, nature and rationales 
3.2.1 Meaning 
Simply put, supervision refers to the task of overseeing the activities and conduct of another 
and making ‘certain that everything is done correctly, safely.’70 This says supervision is a 
double act. It is the act of observing and ensuring that every thing is correct.71 The two acts 
are interrelated in the sense that the act of observing is carried out with a view to accomplish 
the act of ensuring.72 Similarly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has defined 
supervision as ‘a double process.’73 The Court said ‘supervision’ consists in ‘a process of 
[national] review of the actions of [provincial government], so as to measure the fulfilment 
by [provincial government] of executive obligations conferred by statute, and a process of 
implementation of corrective measures should [provincial government] fall short of its 
obligations.’74 This understanding shows that supervision is an act of both ‘review of ... 
                                                            
70 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2003. 
71 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
72 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
73 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370. 
74 The same as above. 
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action,’ which is an act of oversight, and an act of ‘implementation of corrective measures,’ 
which is an act of ensuring.  
 
In states with multi-order government, the need for effective governance of sub-national units 
holds an important place.75 Hence, supervision of regions by the national or federal 
governments is needed by this value and has to be established under a Constitution as one of 
the commonly known constitutional norms.76 In line with this, supervision has been enshrined 
under the SA Constitution.77   
 
3.2.2 Nature 
Under SA Constitution, supervision in general and national supervision in particular has the 
following attributes. To begin with, national supervision, as discussed above, consists of two 
important elements. It has both proactive element, which is an act of oversight or ‘review of 
action’, and reactive element, which represents ‘implementation of corrective measures.’78 
Hence it is made up of corrective power (i.e., a power to correct mistakes made by one level 
or sphere of government) and preventive power79 (i.e., a power to oversee.)80  
 
                                                            
75 Murray 1999, 355. 
76 Murray 1999, 355. Even the framework under which supervision is to be made need to be established under a 
Constitution. Murray 1999, 355. 
77 SA Constitution, Secs 100, 139 & 214 (1) (c); Murray 1999, 355. 
78 DPLG 1999, 24. These elements are implied in the ‘SPEECH BY MINISTER MUFAMADI ON THE 
OCCASION OF BUDGET VOTE NO 22, DEPARTMENT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT, National Council of Provinces, 13 June 2000’ available at 
http://www.search.gov.za/info/previewDocument.jsp?dk=%2Fdata%2Fstatic%2Finfo%2Fspeeches%2F2000%2
F000614355p1004.htm%40SpeechesandStatements&q=%3Cphrase%3E+(issued+by%3A+department+of+prov
incial)+%3CAND%3E(+Category%3Cmatches%3Es+)&t=MUFAMADI%3A+PROVINCIAL+AND+LOCAL
+GOVERNMENT+BUDGET+VOTE+2000%2F2001%2C+NCOP, accessed on 09/08/08.  
79 It is a power to correct irregularities that may lead to mistakes or failure on the part of a given sphere or level 
of government. This can be equated with the saying that runs ‘prevention is better than cure.’ DPLG 1999, 24; 
Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
80 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26; De Visser, 2005, 44. 
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Second, national supervision has to do with the interdependent nature of the three spheres of 
government. As pointed out in Chapter Two, ‘interrelatedness’ refers to the supervision of 
one sphere of government by the other.81 This, as noted by the Constitutional Court, is in line 
with the founding principle stated in Section 1 of the SA Constitution.82 The National 
Government in particular needs to supervise the other spheres so as to ensure that the other 
two spheres are working towards the realization of the provision of better social services, 
adequate standard of living and equitable development opportunity.83  
 
Third, national supervision is an intrusive act,84 in our case into provinces, as it involves 
monitoring and intervention.85 Therefore, it has been confirmed that supervision affects or 
compromises the autonomy of provinces unless properly regulated.86 
 
Fourth, since supervision is intrusive in its nature, there must be clear constitutional rules 
governing it.87 In particular, it has to provide for the reasons and manners of supervision.88 
The SA Constitution does provide for the reasons and manners of all kinds of supervision.89 
                                                            
81 Steytler 1995, available at http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/southAfricag1.pdf, 
accessed on 29/06/08. Others say that the ‘interdependence’ refers to the supervision element. See Malan 2005, 
227. 
82 Premier of the the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and Others, 1999, para. 50; See SA 
Constitution, Sec.1; Murray 1999, 340. 
83 Murray 1999, 340-341; Woolman et’al 2007, 14-8.  
84 De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
para.370. That means an act of intrusion into the exclusive power or functional areas of the sphere of 
government to be supervised, the provincial government.  
85 De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
para.370.   
86 De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
para.370. 
87 De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
para.370; Murray 1999, 355. 
88 De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
para.370; Murray 1999, 355. 
89 SA Constitution, Secs100 & 139; De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370; Murray 1999, 355. 
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At this juncture, it is important to note that the intrusive nature of supervision does not 
necessarily make it undesirable.90 Supervision is rather a necessary evil in some decentralized 
governments.91 Seen in light of South African decentralization, it may be argued that 
supervision is a necessary evil as it is essential to assure that national laws are properly 
implemented in all provinces.92 The significance of supervision is particularly notable when 
seen in light of the fact that the National Government has the power to make important 
policies and laws.93 In fact, one of the underpinning principles of decentralization in South 
Africa is ‘effective government through the implementation of national policy.’94 Second, 
one of the demerits of decentralization of government power is unequal development of sub-
national units (i.e., regions or provinces).95 This particular problem can be addressed through 
supervision.96 
 
Supervision is a necessary evil for it encourages ‘central governments’ to decentralize and 
helps to achieve national objectives that a country sets for itself.97 In South Africa, 
supervision is said to be an integral part of the cooperative government provided under the 
Constitution as it is a means to correct provincial failures that may ‘jeopardize’ the whole 
scheme of  cooperative government.98 
 
                                                            
90 De Visser 2005, 45; Murray 1999, 340-341. 
91 De Visser 2005, 45; Murray 1999, 340-341. 
92 De Visser 2005, 45; Murray 1999, 340-341. ‘[E]stablish a system in which effective delivery of national 
policy is a key element.’ De Visser 2005, 45; Murray 1999, 340-341. 
93 Murray 1999, 341. 
94 Murray 1999, 340. 
95 De Visser 2005, 45. 
96 De Visser 2005, 45 & 197. 
97 De Visser 2005, 45 & 197. 
98 DPLG 1999, 71. 
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Fifth, national supervision should not be taken as the only possible instance of supervision. 
The CRSA shows that supervision may be exercised by other spheres of governments as well. 
In addition to national supervision of provincial governments,99 the Constitution provides for 
provincial supervision of both the National and Local Governments.100 The provinces protect 
their interest in the national law making process through the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP, hereinafter).101 
 
Sixth, national supervision is made upon a constitutionally specified grounds and 
procedures.102 This helps to ensure provincial autonomy.103 Therefore, the National 
Government may not exercise supervisory power on any other ground and in any other 
manner except as enshrined under the Constitution.104 
 
Finally, supervision, including national supervision, is not a one time task. It is rather an 
‘ongoing’ activity as it is a ‘process’.105 As a process, it also signifies an act of follow up and 
correction.106 
 
In the following section, I briefly deal with monitoring and intervention by the National 
Governments into provinces. 
                                                            
99 SA Constitution, Secs 100 & 139 (7); Tapscott 2000 (a), 125; Woolman & et’al 2007, 14-24; Madlingozi & 
Woolman 2007, 19-18. 
100 SA Constitution, Secs 139 & 73-78; Tapscott 2000 (a), 125; Woolman & et’al 2007, 14-24; Madlingozi & 
Woolman 2007, 19-18. 
101 SA Constitution, Secs 100, 139, 67, 163, & 221 (1) (c); Tapscott 2000 (a), 125; Woolman & et’al 2007, 14-
24; Madlingozi & Woolman 2007, 19-18. 
102 SA Constitution, Secs 100 &139. 
103 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370. 
104 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370. 
105 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370. 
106 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.370; De Visser 2005, 45; 
Murray 1999, 340-341. 
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3.2.2.1 Monitoring of provinces 
In South Africa, monitoring is defined as an act that ‘occurs when one sphere measure the 
compliance of another sphere with legislative directives.’107 But what is monitoring?  
 
According to one writer monitoring is ‘[a] continuing function that uses systematic collection 
of data on specified indicators to provide’ information to the supervising organ ‘of the extent 
of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the’ activities to be carried out.108 
Hence, one can say that monitoring is a systematic collection of information on a defined 
time basis to identify problems and corrections that are needed thereto.109 It is different from 
a simple act of checking. It must be regulated by law and carried out regularly.110 Hence, 
through monitoring, the National Government regularly gets information about the activities 
of the Provincial Government. This information may be used by the former in evaluating the 
conduct of the later. 
 
Considering that the SA Constitution does not explicitly deal with the issue of monitoring,111 
one may ask whether the National Government has the authority to monitor provinces. The 
Constitution provides for ‘[n]ational intervention in provincial administration.’112 Does this 
mean national supervision contemplated under the SA Constitution is limited in scope to 
intervention under defined circumstances only? 
 
At first, the CRSA seems to be only contemplating intervention by the National Government. 
However, such conclusion would be incorrect as intervention power can hardly be exercised 
                                                            
107 DPLG 2007, 33. 
108 World Bank, What is Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)?available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/ecd/what_is_me.html, 02/09/08. 
109 …, What is monitoring? available at  http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/index.cfm?pg=166, 29/08/08. 
110 …, What is monitoring? available at  http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/index.cfm?pg=166, 29/08/08. 
111 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
112 SA Constitution, Sec.100. 
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without monitoring or oversight power.113 The National Government has to collect 
information in order to make a proper decision to intervene or not.114 In short, intervention 
without monitoring is impractical. In line with this, scholars argue ‘[i]mplicit in the 
intervention of the national government is a responsibility to see that provinces are 
functioning properly’115 and provinces in South Africa ‘accept that monitoring is required by 
the Constitution’. The problem is how and when monitoring should be made and what it 
should entail?116  
 
It is important to note that monitoring should not be limited only to overseeing whether 
provinces are discharging their executive obligations.117 It has also to do with monitoring ‘the 
performance of provinces in delivering services.’118 This is a qualitative monitoring of good 
and efficient governance, not linked to specific statutory obligations.’119 This is necessary as 
the National Government shares and bears ultimate duty to the people of provinces120 to 
realise the objectives of decentralisation in South Africa like efficient service delivery and 
effective governance.121  
 
                                                            
113 DPLG 1999, 143; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
114 This has to be read in relation with the time and manner of monitoring. The time of monitoring must be 
defined and the information may be submitted by the request of the supervisory organ or by the other organ as 
the case may be. …, Monitoring and evaluation, p.3, available at 
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:ZaYKxNdlJAcJ:www.civicus.org/new/media/Monitoring%2520and%2520
Evaluation.pdf+Monitoring&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=za, accessed on 28/07/08; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 
2007, 20-26. 
115 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
116 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26; DPLG 1999, 143. However, it has been agreed that ‘[a]s a minimum, it 
entails the due performance of provinces’ statutory executive obligations. Whether such obligations are fulfilled 
requires monitoring, and processes giving effect to it should be devised.’ Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
117 See the discussion in the following section, Section 3.2.2.2. 
118 DPLG 1999, 143. 
119 DPLG 1999, 143. It is referred to as the ‘second level of monitoring.’ DPLG 1999, 143.   
120 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.118. 
121 Murray 1999, 340. 
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As far as the manner in which national monitoring should be conducted is concerned, it may 
be done in different manners that range from the most to the more and least intrusive 
processes and by different institutions.122 Practically, national monitoring in South Africa has 
been conducted in those same manners.123 Provinces, however, ‘did not welcome extensive 
and intrusive monitoring.’124  
 
In line with the above discussion, it has been held that monitoring power is implied from the 
intervention power stated under Section 100 of the CRSA.125 In line with the argument that 
supervision power should be clearly specified under a law to protect and strengthen 
provincial autonomy, national monitoring, as it is the case with intervention, should be 
specified in legislation as well.126 
 
Accordingly, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act was introduced in 2005. This 
Act has ‘[t]he overarching purpose of’ creating ‘intergovernmental structures necessary to 
coordinate the development and monitoring of policy and legislation across the spheres of 
government.’127 It was enacted with the aim to create forums that ‘facilitate monitoring of 
                                                            
122 DPLG 1999, 71-72. ‘The least intrusive form is routine reporting on a monthly or yearly basis, which 
compels provinces to put in place systems to provide the required information. A slightly more intrusive form is 
requesting information on a specific issue. This could include the appointment of a commission of inquiry with 
powers to subpoena witnesses and documents. The most intrusive method is the power of entry and inspection.’ 
DPLG 1999, 71-72. The institutions involved in national monitoring include Department of Provincial and 
Local Government and the Department of Finance. DPLG 1999, 71-72. ‘There is sectoral supervision through 
line functions of national departments. Over the past five years there were various national investigations into 
the functioning of provinces. From the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), there were 
the audits by the then director-general, Dr Paseka Ncholo, on the administrative and managerial performance of 
provincial governments (the so called Ncholo Reports, 1998).’ DPLG 1999, 71-72.   
123 DPLG 1999, 72. ‘The Department of Provincial and Local Government ... plays a general monitoring role 
through requesting information [more intrusive manner of monitoring] and visiting provinces [less intrusive 
manner of monitoring as it is simple conduct of visiting, not entry and inspecting. For instance,] [d]uring 1998 
the Minister of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, in conjunction with the Department, 
undertook provincial visits aimed at discussing the progress of the provinces. ... [T]he deputy director-general 
for provincial affairs visited most of the provinces (except Northern Cape and Free State) during August 1999, 
holding discussions with senior officials.’ DPLG 1999, 72.  
124 DPLG 1999, 72. 
125 Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
126 DPLG 1999, 72. 
127 Fesseha & Steytler 2006, 6. (emphasis added); See also DPLG 2006, 9.  
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how policy and legislation is [sic] implemented to ensure that legislative intention translates 
into tangible, measurable results,’ among others.128 Under this Act, provinces are required to 
report to the President’s Co-ordinating Council at least once a year. 129 This can reasonably be 
taken as a mechanism of monitoring provinces by the National Government. But still, 
provinces are uncertain as to the number of report they are required to submit for the Act 
provides for the minimum number of report only, which is once a year. This formulation does 
not seem to prohibit the request of additional reports from provinces by the National 
Government. 
 
Finally, monitoring in general and delivery of services, in particular, requires establishing key 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact indicators. It also requires putting in place systems to 
collect record and analyse information relating to such indicators with a view to use the 
information to inform proper administration or service delivery in the provinces.130 But all 
these should be done in consultation and agreement with Provincial and National 
Governments.131 
 
3.2.2.2 Intervention into provinces 
Intervention is defined as ‘the unilateral interference by one sphere into the affairs of another 
sphere in order to remedy an unacceptable situation.’132 Intervention into provinces by 
National Government (national intervention hereinafter) in South Africa, therefore, refers to a 
unilateral interference by the National Government into the affairs of Provincial Government 
with a view to rectify the failure to ‘fulfill executive obligations.’133 With this definition in 
                                                            
128 Fesseha & Steytler 2006, 6; See also DPLG 2006, 9.  
129 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005, Sec. 20. 
130 See Monitoring and evaluation, p.7, available at 
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:ZaYKxNdlJAcJ:www.civicus.org/new/media/Monitoring%2520and%2520
Evaluation.pdf+Monitoring&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=za, accessed on 28/07/08. 
131 DPLG 1999, 72.  
132 DPLG 2007, 34. 
133 SA Constitution, Sec 100; Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
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mind, I shall proceed to examine the substantive and procedural requirements of national 
intervention in South Africa. 
 
i) Substantive requirements 
Substantive requirements are conditions or facts134 that should exist to enable the National 
Government to intervene into provinces. 
 
The SA Constitution provides that a national intervention may be made ‘[w]hen a province 
cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation.’135 Though not defined by legislation, it has 
been submitted that executive obligation is an obligation to implement laws and excludes the 
obligation to make laws.136 Therefore, national intervention is allowed only when a province 
fails to implement laws or policies and not when it fails to make laws.137 The executive 
obligation a province is alleged to fail should also be an obligation that exists under 
legislation and the legislation should be in force.138 Any other provincial executive obligation 
that cannot be traced back to a law in force may not authorize an intervention into provincial 
administration under the Constitution.139 From this fact follows that the national government 
must show a specific provision under a law140 that imposes an executive obligation on a 
                                                            
134 SA Constitution, Sec 100; Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34; De Visser 1999, 5. 
135 SA Constitution, Sec.100 (1); Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
136 Roberts 2002, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310799, accessed on 08/11/08; 
De Visser 1999, 7; Tapscott 2000 (b), 6; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. The National Government has 
intervened into the Province of Mpumalanga where the provincial government would ‘not be able to fulfil some 
of its executive obligations’ ‘due to its cash flow difficulties in terms of law’ despite the bold steps already taken 
over a period of about 18 months to address the precarious state of the Province’s finances. See General Notice 
947 of 2001, National Treasury General Notice, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and the Government of the Province of Mpumalanga in terms of Section 100 of the Constitution. 
137 DPLG 2007, 41. This does not mean that legislative intervention is not allowed. Legislative intervention, 
however, is dealt with under another section. SA Constitution, Sec.42 (2); Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
138 De Visser 1999, 7. It has been said that ‘[a]n intervention in case of failure to fulfil an obligation presupposes 
a pre-existing legal obligation.’ De Visser 1999, 7. 
139 De Visser 1999, 7; Roberts 2002, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310799, 
accessed on 08/11/08; Tapscott 2000 (b), 6; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
140 The law may be either national or provincial legislation, or SA Constitution or provincial Constitution, if 
any. De Visser 1999, 7; Roberts 2002, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310799, 
accessed on 08/11/08; Tapscott 2000 (b), 6; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26.  
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province, the specific obligation thereto and failure on the part of the province to carryout 
that obligation before initiating any attempt to intervene.141 
 
The next issue is whether all types of failure to fulfil executive obligations results in a 
national intervention of the same nature. National intervention is an act of the national 
executive that may constitute a range of acts as it is deemed to include ‘any appropriate 
steps.’142 Therefore, national intervention in the form of an assumption of responsibility in all 
cases is not, for instance, what the drafters of the Constitution intended. Intervention in such 
manner is allowed only if such failure is prejudicial to ‘essential national standards, 
established minimum standards for the rendering of a service, economic unity, or national 
security, or that is prejudicial to the interests of another province or the country as a 
whole.’143 
 
Another issue is whether the particular cause that precipitates the failure of the province to 
fulfil an executive obligation matters.144 The SA Constitution provides that intervention is 
lawful ‘[w]hen a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation.’ Therefore, the 
cause of the failure to fulfil an executive obligation may be either the inability or lack of 
willingness on the part of the provincial government.145 Consequently, the intention of the 
province is immaterial.146 Whenever a province fails to fulfil its executive obligation, be it as 
a result of incompetence, inability or unwillingness, the National Government can intervene 
lawfully.  
 
                                                            
141 Roberts 2002, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310799, accessed on 
08/11/08; De Visser 1999, 7; Tapscott 2000 (b), 6; Murray & Ampofo-Anti 2007, 20-26. 
142 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. Such steps ‘include the issuing of directives to the provincial government 
or, in certain circumstances, the direct assumption by the National Government of responsibility for the 
neglected executive obligation.’ Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34.  
143 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, paras 119-121. 
144 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.266; De Visser 1999, 6. 
145 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.266; De Visser 1999, 6. 
146 De Visser 1999, 6. 
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The extent of assumption of provincial executive power by the national government is also an 
important issue.147 Whenever intervention is allowed, it should have a clear scope.148 
Otherwise, it would amount to providing for an intrusive power without limitation.149 Such 
arrangement will compromise provincial autonomy. Accordingly, the issue here is whether 
the scope of national intervention has been outlined under the SA Constitution.  A close look 
discloses that the Constitution limits the scope of the intervention to the particular executive 
obligation that the provincial government failed to fulfil150 as it is ‘to ensure fulfilment of that 
obligation.’151 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the National Government has two discretionary powers as 
far as intervention into a provincial administration is concerned. First, it has the discretion to 
decide to intervene or not.152 This can be seen from the discretionary formulation of the 
Constitution.153 Therefore, not only the power to intervene but also the power to decide 
whether intervention should be made rests on the National Government.154 Secondly, the 
National Government has the discretion to decide on the form and extent of the 
intervention.155 This can be seen from the phrase ‘by taking any appropriate step.’156 
 
                                                            
147 Murray 1999, 355; De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, para.370. 
148 Murray 1999, 355; De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, para.370. 
149 Murray 1999, 355; De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, para.370. 
150 Murray 1999, 355; De Visser 2005, 169-171; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, para.370; Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
151 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34 (emphasis added). 
152 De Visser 1999, 12. 
153 It provides that ‘the national executive may intervene.’ See SA Constitution, Sec.100; De Visser 1999, 7 
(emphasis added). 
154 De Visser 1999, 7. 
155 De Visser 1999, 7. 
156 De Visser 1999, 7. SA Constitution, Sec.100.  
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ii) Procedural requirements 
Procedural requirements refer to the manner by which the National Government takes what 
the Constitution puts as ‘any appropriate steps’ with a view to ensure the realization of the 
provincially unfulfilled executive obligation.157 In other words, it refers to how national 
intervention should be made.158 In the following paragraphs, the discussion focuses on the 
procedure of national intervention as outlined by the SA Constitution. 159 
 
As far as the procedure for national intervention is concerned, there are various ways of 
intervention for different kinds of failures to fulfil provincial executive obligations.160 This 
conclusion is also supported by the indicative or illustrative term ‘including’ under SA 
Constitution.161 The consequence that follows from a failure to fulfil a particular obligation 
seems to guide the national executive in choosing or determining the ‘appropriate step’ that it 
should take in a form of intervention.162 For instance, national intervention in the form of 
assumption of responsibility is deemed to be the ‘appropriate step’ if such failure is 
prejudicial to ‘essential national standards, established minimum standards for the rendering 
of a service, economic unity, or national security, or that is prejudicial to the interests of 
another province or the country as a whole.’163 
Before the national executive intervenes into the provincial administration, it has to first issue 
directives to the provincial government.164 Directive is ‘an official instruction.’165 It is an 
instruction that should set out ‘the failure of the provincial government and the steps that are 
                                                            
157 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2003. 
158 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2003. 
159 SA Constitution, Sec.100. 
160 DPLG 1999, 143. 
161 SA Constitution, Sec.100 (1); De Visser 1999, 7; In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, paras115-117.  
162 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
163 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, paras 119-121. 
164 In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para. 120. 
165 Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2003. 
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required to make sure they are met.’166 It serves as a form of intervention167 as it requires the 
provincial government to act in a certain way.168 
 
After issuing directives, the national executive may intervene into a provincial administration 
by assuming responsibility provided that ‘the directive is not complied with.’169 When 
intervention is made in this manner, two important limitations must be observed. First, the 
assumption must be for those obligations which are relevant to rectify the consequences of 
the failure by the provincial administration.170 Therefore, the assumption of responsibility 
goes only ‘to the extent that is necessary to do so for any of the purposes set out’ under the 
Constitution.171 Secondly, such intervention should obtain the approval of the NCOP.172 
Should the national executive intervene in the form of assumption of responsibility, it is 
required to ‘submit a written notice of the intervention to the [NCOP] within 14 days after the 
intervention began.’173 
 
The NCOP is given the discretion to approve or disapprove the intervention. Disapproval 
could be explicit or implied. If the NCOP is not convinced about the grounds for intervention 
and would like to end the intervention, it should do so explicitly. Contrary to this, implied 
approval of intervention is deemed to authorize intervention for six months only.174 If the 
                                                            
166 DPLG 2007, 41. 
167 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (1) (a).  
168 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (1) (a). 
169 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (1) (b). 
170 DPLG 2007, 41; In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.265. 
171 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, para.265; See SA Constitution, 
Sec.100 (1) (b). 
172 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
173 SA Constitution, Sec.100 (2) (a). 
174 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (2) (b). 
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NCOP does not explicitly approve an intervention within six months, the national executive 
is required to end the intervention upon the lapse of six months.175 
 
It is also important to note that the role of the NCOP is not only limited to the approval or 
rejection of the intervention. It extends to periodic or regular review of the intervention.176 
NCOP’s review power includes but is not limited to checking whether the situation that 
called for the intervention still exists. If the situation does not exist any more or any thing that 
needs attention of the national executive is there, it makes ‘any appropriate 
recommendations’ to the national executive.177 This may include the ending of the 
intervention.178 It is important to note that the role of the NCOP is limited in cases where the 
intervention is approved expressly.179 In such cases, the NCOP only reviews the intervention 
and makes recommendation. The national executive may, however, disregard the 
recommendation. But the decision to disregard such recommendations could be justiciable as 
it impacts on the institutional integrity of the provincial government. This being the 
theoretical construction, it has been said that the NCOP can terminate intervention at all 
times.180 
 
3.2.3 Rationales of supervision in South Africa 
Supervision, in general, and national supervision, in particular, is needed for different reasons 
and may be justified on different grounds. It may be difficult to exhaustively list its 
importance. But in addition to the merit each of its components may have, supervision in 
national supervision is said to be necessary for the realization of effective service delivery 
and governance in provinces.181 Supervision can be regarded as one of the tools that the 
                                                            
175 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (2) (b). 
176 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (2) (c). 
177 DPLG 2007, 41; SA Constitution, Sec.100 (2) (c). 
178 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
179 Chaskalson & Klaaren 1999, 3-34. 
180 DPLG 2007, 42. 
181 Murray 1999, 341. 
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national government can use in ensuring the achievement of the objectives of decentralization 
in South Africa, which include effective service delivery and governance.182 
 
Second, supervision is ‘an important way of improving the performance of’ government as it 
presents incentive to the provincial governments and provided an opportunity to correct a 
failure to discharge executive obligations.183 It can even be argued that it is of equal value or 
importance as that of decentralization in improving the performance of government.184 
 
Third, supervision in general and monitoring in particular contributes in establishing well 
organized decentralized governance185 as it is a means to oversee performance at all 
provinces.186 
 
Finally, supervision enables the national government to ‘ensure that mistakes are rectified in 
time’ when a province ‘can or does not fulfil executive obligations’ arising from 
legislations.187 It can also be helpful to avoid negative consequences and when such negative 
consequences happen, to limit their impact.188 
                                                            
182 Murray 1999, 341.  
183 Nyiri, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pdf, 
accessed on 28/07/08. 
184  Nyiri 4, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pdf, 
accessed on 28/07/08. 
185 Nyiri 4, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pdf, 
accessed on 28/07/08; Thompson 1991, 53. 
186 Decentralisation does not only need  the division of government functions to sub-national units and the centre 
but also  needs the prior setting of ‘procedures for setting objectives and monitoring..., and a control structure 
that links each responsibility center to the goal of the organization as a whole.’ Nyiri 4, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pdf, accessed on 28/07/08; 
Thompson 1991, 53. It should also not be taken that supervision is a feature of centralization as ‘[c]entralisation 
is not policy direction from the top, hierarchically established goals, and central control procedures. These are 
the characteristics of all well-managed organizations.’ Nyiri 4, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pdf, accessed on 28/07/08; 
Thompson 1991, 53.  
187 SA Constitution, Sec.100; Hessel 2006, 99. 
188 Steinich 2000, 5-6. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
In sum, this chapter has shown that national supervision has been provided under the SA 
Constitution for various reasons. It is also indicated that supervision consists of an act of 
monitoring and intervention on specified grounds. The discussion has also revealed that 
although national intervention has been regulated to a reasonable degree, such is not the case 
with national monitoring. 
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Chapter Four 
Supervision of Regions by the Federal Government in Ethiopia 
4.1 Introduction 
Federalism is in effect decentralisation189 and the federal government need to know what is 
going on in the states in a constitutionally established basis.190 In line with this, practically, 
the Federal Government of Ethiopia is supervising regions. The extent and manner of the 
supervision and monitoring is neither wholly regulated nor similar. In some regions, the 
extent of supervision and monitoring is higher than in others.191 This chapter assesses the 
supervisory role of the Federal Government of Ethiopia over Regional Governments. 
 
4.2 The supervisory role of the Federal Government of Ethiopia with regard to regions 
It is not an easy task to identify the supervisory role of the Federal Government of Ethiopia 
by looking at the FDRE Constitution as it is not clearly spelt out except in relation with 
subsidies to disadvantaged regions.192 The question is: does the Federal Government have a 
supervisory power except with respect to subsidies? In order to provide an answer to this 
question, it is important to examine the FDRE Constitution in light of the elements of 
supervision set out in chapter three. The first issue that need to be addressed is will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.1 Federal Monitoring 
Does the FDRE Constitution give the federal government the power to monitor regional 
governments? This study suggests a negative answer. The Federal Government does not have 
                                                            
189 Serra-Horguelin, The federal experiment in Ethiopia: A socio-political analysis, available at  
http://www.cean.sciencespobordeaux.fr/page%20perso/TD64.pdf. 
190 Woolman et’al 2007, 14-3-14-5. 
191 Ayenew 2002, 140. 
192 FDRE Constitution, Art.94 (2). 
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a constitutional basis to monitor Regional Governments. In practice, however, the Federal 
Government monitors Regional Governments and some legislation support the practice of 
such monitoring.193 For example, the Ministry of Federal Affairs practically monitors 
Regional Governments in relation to conflicts among and within regions. The Ministry has 
established a conflict prevention office, which focuses on monitoring the likelihood of 
conflicts and engages in preventive work in areas of conflict. The Ministry was also 
preparing to launch a conflict mapping program in September 2008.194 The FDRE 
Constitution does not, however, explicitly authorize the Federal Government to do so. The 
constitutionality of these practices of the Ministry could be challenged. One may, however, 
argue that such monitoring power should be implied from the power of the Federal 
Government to resolve conflicts arising between and among regions.195  
 
The Environmental Protection Authority of Ethiopia is empowered to monitor Regional 
Governments in the implementation of environmental policies, strategies and laws. This can 
be read from the objective, powers and duties of the Authority as set out under the 
Environmental Protection Organ Establishment Proclamation and others.196 It is also possible 
to read this power of the Authority from the duty of Regional Governments to report to the 
Authority ‘on the respective state of the environment and sustainable development of their 
respective states.’197 Moreover, it is reasonable to see the need for monitoring by the 
Authority where Regional Governments in particular opt to ‘issue and implement their own’ 
environmental standards as these standards should not be less stringent than the federal 
environmental standards.198 It appears to be practically difficult to ensure regions’ 
compliance with such standards in absence of monitoring by the Federal Government. This 
practice may be supported by the fact that regions are required to implement federal laws 
                                                            
193 See Proclamation No.456/2005, Art.16 (2) (3); FDRE Constitution, Art.52 (2) (d); Proclamation No.471/ 
2005, Art.13 (2) (3), Art.19 (9), Art.17 (3) (4) & Art.14 (1). 
194 Interview with Ato Tsegaw Mekonnen, Conflict Prevention and Resolution expert at the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs, July 6, 2008. 
195 FDRE Constitution, Art.62 (6). 
196 Proclamation No.295/2002, Arts 5 & 6 (2) (7) (9) (11) (21) (22); Proclamation No.300/2000, Art.5 (2) (4). 
197 Proclamation No.295/2002, Art.15 (5). 
198 Proclamation No.295/2002, Art.15(4); Proclamation No.300/2000, Art.6 (4). 
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with respect to natural resources and the power of the Federal Government to ensure the 
implementation of such laws.199  
 
Finally, the Ministry of Health receives reports from Regional Governments at least once a 
year.200 It has established committees and reporting systems to oversee, among others, the 
implementation of the health sector development programmes by the Regional 
Governments.201 Under the Health Management Information System (HMIS)/ Monitoring 
and Evaluation (M&E), there is a concept called participatory review meetings whereby the 
Federal Ministry of Health ‘gathers Regional Health Bureau managers and program experts 
in Annual Review Meeting’, and a concept called supportive supervision through which the 
Ministry may get information via ‘HMIS reporting to understand the weakness and strength 
of’ regions in health sector and provide supervision that is ‘supportive and empowering.’202 
However, what kind of supervision is ‘supportive and empowering’ is not clearly indicated. 
This might be compromising regions’ autonomy as it is a broad description. 
 
Furthermore, the Ministry has been developing supervision guidelines since January 2008 
and that may be used in the future.203 This writer had no access to the document. The 
Ministry has also been the sole organ ‘publishing Health and Health Related Indicators 
annually’ for, at least, the last ten years.204 Furthermore, one of the open-ended powers of the 
Ministry relating to its monitoring power is that it has the power to ‘[a]ct on issues revealed 
by monitoring information.’205 This has a negative effect impacting on the autonomy of 
regions. 
 
                                                            
199 FDRE Constitution, Art.52 (2) (d).  
200 Federal Ministry of Health, Health Management Information System (HIMS) Reform Team 2008, 6. 
201 Federal Ministry of Health, Planning and Programming Department 2005, 28-29. 
202 Federal Ministry of Health, Health Management Information System (HIMS) Reform Team 2008, 3-4. 
203 Federal Ministry of Health, Health Management Information System (HIMS) Reform Team 2008, 5. 
204 Federal Ministry of Health, Health Management Information System (HIMS) Reform Team 2008, 4.   
205 Federal Ministry of Health 2007, 48-60. 
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It is difficult to find constitutional clauses that support these practises of the Ministry, be it 
explicitly or implicitly. However, in light of the general power of the Ministry to ‘direct the 
country’s health sector development’1 it may be argued that it has a monitoring power. 
Regardless of the validity of the argument, monitoring power should be clearly stated and 
delimited. 
 
However, some of the laws and practice do not have constitutional basis, even by implication. 
With respect to organs that may claim federal monitoring based on an implicit constitutional 
authorization, there is no clear law that sets out the manner of monitoring and what it should 
entail.  
 
4.2.2 Intervention into regions by the Federal Government in Ethiopia  
As far as the FDRE Constitution is concerned, the concept of intervention is provided for 
under Articles 51(4), 55(16) and 62(9). It is also defined in relation with these provisions as 
‘a system for intervention in the regions pursuant to Article 62(9) of the Constitution and 
includes measures to be taken in accordance with Article 51(14) or Article 55(16) of the 
Constitution.’206 At this juncture, it is important to evaluate whether the intervention 
enshrined under the FDRE Constitution conforms to the understanding of intervention as 
outlined in this study. As indicated earlier, intervention is a unilateral act of interference by 
the Federal Government into the ‘affairs’ of Regional Governments. In the next sections, the 
writer discusses the following questions: who intervenes, when intervention is allowed, and 
how intervention is to be made and for how long? 
 
4.2.2.1 Types of intervention 
The FDRE Constitution deals with intervention under three provisions207 providing for 
intervention on different grounds.208 Therefore, it seems possible to conclude that there are 
                                                            
206 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.2(1). 
207 FDRE Constitution, Arts 51(4), 55(16) & 62(9). 
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three types of interventions under the Constitution. Whether such conclusion is warranted 
will be shown in the subsequent discussions. 
 
4.2.2.2 When is intervention allowed under the FDRE Constitution? 
According to the FDRE Constitution, intervention in a regional government is allowed only 
under one of the following situations (substantive requirements).  
 
The first ground of federal intervention is when there is ‘a deteriorating security situation 
within’ a region and when the Regional ‘authorities are unable to control it.’209 This provision 
raises two important issues. The first issue is: what constitutes ‘a deteriorating security 
situation?’ The Constitution does not provide for a definition. This may be understandable as 
a Constitution is supposed to be a general document and details are to be supplemented by 
subsidiary legislations. Unfortunately, neither does the Constitution authorize any particular 
organ to define this phrase. Can the Federal Government define it under a federal law? 
Although it may be argued that there is no need for statutory interpretation as it is a 
constitutional power, it is useful to define the phrase to provide certainty in the process of 
intervention and guarantee regional autonomy.  
 
It is argued that the Federal Government does not have such power. First, the Federal 
Government has only the powers explicitly given to it by the FDRE Constitution. It is 
important to note that ‘powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or 
concurrently to the Federal Government and States’ are left for the Regional Governments.210 
The power to make a law to define a circumstance amounting to the deterioration of security 
situation is one such power. Second, it is important to note that the policing power is given to 
the regions and, consequently, they should define what a deteriorating situation of security 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
208 FDRE Constitution, Arts 51(4), 55(16) & 62(9). 
209 FDRE Constitution, Art.51(14). 
210 FDRE Constitution, Art.52(1). Emphasis added. 
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is.211 Third, in situation of deteriorating security, it is the regions that demand intervention. 
The situation gives rise to a right in favour of the regions. Therefore, when and under what 
situation to exercise such power should be left to them. Regions should be able to request not 
only intervention by the Federal Government but also determine a situation that amounts to ‘a 
deteriorating security situation’ as that enables them to exercise their power, right and duty of 
calling for such intervention. Generally, it is contended that the power to determine a 
situation that amounts to ‘a deteriorating security situation’ rests with the Regional 
Governments. However, some scholars argue that what constitutes a deteriorating security 
situation should be determined by the Federal Government on the basis that the power to 
determine when to intervene is inherent in the power to supervise.   
 
In practice, however, ‘a deteriorating security situation’ has been described by the Federal 
Government in a proclamation. According to that proclamation, ‘a deteriorating security 
situation’ is a situation in which ‘there is an activity that disturbs the peace and safety of the 
public’ in a region.212 
 
The second issue is whether the mere deterioration of security situation suffices to request 
intervention by the Federal Government? The FDRE Constitution is clear in this regard. 
Intervention should be requested only if the authorities of the requesting region are not able 
to control a deteriorating security situation. Security situation in a region may deteriorate for 
one or another reason. In such cases, the obligation to maintain the security of a region 
primarily rests upon the Regional Government itself.213 But in cases where a deteriorating 
security situation goes beyond the control of a Regional Government, the Federal 
Government may extend its help to restore the security of the requesting region. It is only in 
the later situation that the system of intervention is functional.   
 
                                                            
211 FDRE Constitution, Art.52(2)(g). 
212 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.3. 
213 As policing power is Regional power. See the FDRE Constitution, Art.52(2)(g). 
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As far as this ground of intervention is concerned, it is not convincing to call it an 
intervention. Intervention is a unilateral act of the Federal Government. But, in this case the 
Federal Government interferes into regions only upon their request. 
 
The second ground of intervention is when regional ‘authorities are unable to arrest violations 
of human rights within their jurisdiction.’214 But there is an issue to be raised at this point. 
The issue is whether protection of human rights is an exclusive power of the regions. This is 
to see whether there is intervention in the strict sense of the term. The answer is in the 
negative. 
 
As far as this ground of intervention is concerned, there are two important requirements for a 
lawful intervention. First, there must be human rights violations in the region. When can one 
say acts of human rights violation have been committed and thus intervention should be 
made? A federal law provides that human rights violations is deemed to exist ‘where an act is 
committed...in violation’ of the human rights provisions under chapter three of the FDRE 
Constitution, and other laws passed in accordance thereto.215  From where should information 
concerning human rights violation come? The information may come from the Human Rights 
Commission, a member of the House of Peoples’ Representatives from the region in which 
the human rights violation is committed, or any other person, be it juridical or physical.216 
The issue not sufficiently addressed is: what should be the extent of the human rights 
violations to invite a federal intervention?  
 
The second prerequisite for intervention on the grounds of human rights violations is the 
inability on the part of a region to arrest the same. Human rights violations in a particular 
Region do not outright give the Federal Government the right to intervene into a region. The 
Federal Government must make sure that there is a failure on the part of the region to arrest 
                                                            
214 FDRE Constitution, Art.55 (16). 
215 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.7. 
216 Proclamation No.359/2003, Arts 2 (2) & 8(1). 
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such violation.217 Therefore, whenever human rights violations exist, the Federal Government 
may intervene provided that the Regional Government is unable to arrest such violation. 
Hence, a mere incident of human rights violation does not simply allow the Federal 
Government to intervene. Here, it is important to note that although the National Government 
may not deploy force, it may intervene in another way. As said above, the concept 
intervention is broadly defined to include any ‘appropriate measure.’ The writer deals with 
this in the next section. 
 
To conclude, the second ground of intervention is not clear as the FDRE Constitution 
requires both the Federal and Regional Governments to protect human rights.218 If human 
rights protection is not in the exclusive area of regions, the act of the Federal Government to 
address human rights violations may not, strictly speaking, constitute an intervention. In 
addition, it is not clear whether federal intervention is possible when a regional policy 
violates human rights in the region. But if the Federal Government can interfere into regions 
on such grounds, such an act may safely be regarded as an intervention. 
 
The third ground of intervention is a situation that ‘endangers the constitutional order.’219 
Where there is a situation that puts the constitutional order in danger, the Federal 
Government is empowered to intervene and stabilize the situation. This is a direct follow up 
of the duty of the Federal Government to protect and defend the Constitution and the order 
established thereby.220 Emphasis should be given to the way Article 51 of the Constitution is 
framed. The duty to defend and protect the Constitution and the order established under it is 
the first duty of the Federal Government. Of the different organs of the Federal Government, 
                                                            
217 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.7. 
218 FDRE Constitution, Art.13 (1). 
219 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.62 (9). Is the state of emergency one type of intervention for the House of 
Federation under this ground? A famous Ethiopian scholar argues that federal intervention on the third ground 
‘can not be anything but a state of emergency.’ Nahum 1997, 76. But I do not agree with him. Because, a state 
of emergency is declared when the grounds specified under Article 93 exist. Secondly, even if it is said to be a 
state of emergency, the power to declare a state of emergency is given to the Council of Ministers not the House 
of Federation. See FDRE Constitution, Art.93 (1) (a). 
220 FDRE Constitution, Art.51 (1). 
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the House of Federation is the ‘ultimate defender of the constitutional order in Ethiopia.’221 
Consequently, intervention in such instance is left within the competence of this House.222 
 
At this juncture, it is important to see whether the intervention contemplated under the third 
ground is an intervention in the sense of intrusion into the exclusive areas of Regional 
Governments. Accordingly, if we look into the FDRE Constitution, it is possible to see that 
the duty to defend and protect the Constitution is a power given to both the Federal and 
Regional Governments.223 This renders it difficult to talk of intervention in the strict sense 
unless the Constitution is interpreted in such a way that the power to protect and defend the 
Federal Constitution is a Regional power as long as the regions can do so. 
 
Having said that, what acts are regarded as acts that endanger ‘the constitutional order?’ Such 
acts are acts that are ‘carried out by the participation or consent of a Regional Government in 
violation of the Constitution or the constitutional order.’224 They include ‘armed uprising; 
resolving conflicts between another region or Nation, Nationality or People of another region 
by resorting to non-peaceful means; disturbance of peace and security of the Federal 
Government;’ or non-compliance to the directives given by the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives to a respective region in which an act of human rights violations occurred to 
arrest same.225 
 
At this point, it is important to raise the issue what happens if any of these acts or activities is 
not carried out by the consent or the participation of the Regional Governments? It is clear 
that such act does not fall into the category of acts that endanger the ‘constitutional order.’ 
The problem is that it may actually ‘endanger the Constitution order’ and it is in violation of 
                                                            
221 Nahum 1997, 75. 
222 FDRE Constitution, Art.62 (9). 
223 FDRE Constitution, Arts 51 (1) & 52 (2) (a). 
224 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.12. 
225 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.12 (1) - (4). 
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the Constitution. For instance, an armed uprising or demonstration226 is a clear violation of 
the Constitution as such act is not allowed by the Constitution and endangers the 
constitutional order.227 This puts such acts in the ranks of acts that endanger the constitutional 
order, in the language of the FDRE Constitution. But the federal law complicated the issue by 
inserting a concept of Regional Government’s consent or participation. Leaving the 
constitutionality of the law aside, it is possible to see that even if such acts without the 
consent of the region in which they happen are not deemed to be acts endangering the 
constitutional order, they may fall into the other grounds of intervention. For instance, if there 
is an armed uprising in a certain region without the consent or participation of the region, the 
region may attempt to arrest the uprising and, in case of failure, it may request the Federal 
Government to intervene. This safely falls into the first ground of intervention discussed 
above.  But it is difficult to determine whether ‘disturbance of peace and security of the 
Federal Government’ by an activity or act in a Regional Government without the consent or 
participation of such region presents a ground of intervention. In the language of the FDRE 
Constitution, it is a clear case of putting the constitutional order in danger. The same act 
would not be considered as an act that ‘endangers the constitutional order’ if we rely on the 
language of the federal law. 
 
It is important to note that, unlike the first two grounds of intervention, under the third ground 
of intervention there is no need to look into the responses of the Regional Government. This 
is because it is difficult to expect a Regional Government that consents to or participates in 
acts that endanger the constitutional order to make an attempt to arrest them. 
 
4.2.2.3 How is intervention to be made? 
This subsection focuses on the procedure and measures to be taken under the concept of 
intervention in Ethiopia. Before going to the discussion, however, it is important to bear in 
mind that the FDRE Constitution does not really provide for an exhaustive system of 
procedure for intervention. The complete picture of the ‘how’ of intervention can be captured 
                                                            
226 Armed demonstration is unlawful. See FDRE Constitution, Art.30 (1). 
227 FDRE Constitution, Art.30 (1). 
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only through the analysis of both the federal law and the Constitution. Accordingly, focusing 
on the grounds for intervention, I will deal with the ‘how’ of intervention in light of these two 
laws below. 
 
i) Procedure for intervention on the first ground 
In this case, intervention should be initiated by the Regional Government itself. It has to 
make a request to the Federal Government to intervene. This makes the act of the Federal 
Government discretionary. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not an intervention as defined 
under chapter three. Having that in mind, the request for intervention has to be made to one 
of the offices vested with ‘[t]he highest executive powers of the Federal Government,’ i.e. the 
office of the Prime Minister.228 This is because under the first ground of intervention, the 
request can result in the deployment of Federal defence forces.229 Therefore, it is proper to 
direct the request to the Prime Minister as he is ‘the Commander-in-Chief of the national 
armed forces.’230 The request has to be made by the State Council, which is ‘highest organ of 
State authority’ and legislative of the Region, or the highest executive organ of the region, 
which is ‘[t]he State administration.’231 The request can not be made directly to the office of 
the Prime Minister but to The Ministry of Federal Affairs, which serves as a bridge for such 
request.232 
 
Why is the Ministry involved in the communication? It is because the Ministry is supposed to 
‘coordinate the implementation of decisions authorizing the intervention of the Federal 
Government in the affairs of Regional States’.233 Therefore, its involvement from the outset 
of the process is advantageous for the smooth operation of the intervention. Such prior notice 
                                                            
228 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.4; FDRE Constitution, Art.72 (1). The other office vested with the highest 
executive authority is the Council of Ministers. See FDRE Constitution, Art.72 (1). 
229 FDRE Constitution, Art.51 (14). 
230 FDRE Constitution, Art.74 (1). 
231 FDRE Constitution, Art.50 (3) (5) (6); Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.4. 
232 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.4. 
233 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.21 (4). 
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should also been given to the Ministry of Defence as it is the one responsible for the 
enforcement of ‘security measures and the constitutional order...where situations endangering 
public safety are beyond the control of Regional States’ and when such intervention is 
ordered in accordance with the law.234  The issue not addressed is about the Federal Police 
Commission. Can it be deployed? Should it be communicated? 
 
Who should be deployed? The Constitution empowers the Federal government to deploy 
‘Federal defence forces.’235 Though it is not clear, the ‘Federal defence forces’, as a broader 
concept,236 include the Federal Police and the National Defence Force.237 This is also 
consistent with the practice. If one agrees with this interpretation, it is possible to see the need 
for prior notice of a request for Federal intervention for the Federal Police Commission as 
well. 
 
When one comes to the measures to be taken, it is important to see number and mandate of 
the force to be deployed. The number and mandate of the force deployed as a result of 
intervention into a Regional State pursuant to the first ground of Federal intervention is 
determined based on the situation of the deteriorated security. The force has to be a size that 
can bring the security situation under control and the measures to be taken by the same 
should also ‘be proportionate to enable to arrest the deteriorating security situation and 
maintain law and order.’238 Neither the excessive number of Federal defence forces nor the 
use of excessive measures is allowed. Whether the number of the Federal defence forces or 
the measures taken is proportional or not has to be determined on a case by case basis. In 
addition to arresting the deteriorating security situation, the Federal defence forces are 
                                                            
234 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.24 (5). 
235 FDRE Constitution, Art.51 (14). 
236 Compare Art.51 (14) & Art.55 (7) of the FDRE Constitution. 
237 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.5 (1).  
238 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.5 (2). 
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responsible to ‘take necessary legal measures to bring to justice those who participated in 
deteriorating the security situation’ in the region.239 
 
Coming to the role of other bodies during intervention on the first ground, the organs worth 
mentioning are the Regional Government and the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR). 
The Regional Government is obliged to provide all available information required in the task 
of arresting the ‘deteriorating security situation and facilitate conditions’ for such arrest.240 
As far as the HPR is concerned, it has a checking role. It follows up how the intervention is 
going on and on the activities carried out to arrest the deteriorating situation in the Region. 
This power, however, is not clearly mentioned. It can be read from the duty of the Prime 
Minister to report ‘on the activities carried out’ by the Federal defence forces in the regions to 
the House periodically.241 But the law is not clear as to within what period the Prime Minister 
has to make such a report. It simply states that ‘[t]he Prime Minister shall present a periodic 
report.’242 
 
Finally, such intervention lasts until either of the following situations happens: either until the 
situation that deteriorates the security situation in the region has been successfully arrested or 
the Regional council or the highest executive organ of the region requests its termination.243 
This begs two questions: First, can the Regional Council request termination when the 
intervention is requested by the highest executive organ of the State or vice versa? This thesis 
suggests a supportive answer. The Regional Council is the highest State authority in the 
Region. Therefore, it has a power to terminate an intervention requested by the Regional 
State’s highest executive organ. The power of the highest executive organ of the region to 
terminate intervention requested by the Regional Council by is, however, questionable. 
 
                                                            
239 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.5 (4). 
240 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.5 (3). 
241 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.6. 
242 The same as above. 
243 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.5 (5). 
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Second, can the termination of an intervention be demanded even if the deteriorating security 
situation is not completely arrested? The answer is yes. First, the intervention in such a 
situation is only valid upon the consent and request of the Regional Government. Therefore, 
any time the region feels that it no longer needs the assistance of the Federal defence force, it 
can validly request the termination of the federal mission or intervention. Secondly, the way 
the law is framed does not make a distinction as to when a Regional Council or the highest 
executive organ of the state can request the Prime Minister to terminate the intervention. 
Therefore, it seems that the termination can be requested regardless of whether the 
deteriorating security situation has been arrested or not. For instance, at a certain time after 
intervention by the Federal Government, the Regional Council or the highest executive organ 
in the region may feel that it can now takeover the situation and arrest the deteriorating 
security situation. In such cases, it may request the termination of the mission and the 
withdrawal of the Federal defence forces even if the situation is not brought under control. Of 
course, it is up to the region to request for assistance and the moment the region thinks that it 
no longer needs the help of the Federal Government, it can request the termination of the 
mission or intervention. But one may still wonder if there are available remedies if the 
Federal defence forces refuse to terminate their mission despite the successful arrest of the 
deteriorating security situation in the region? The immediate and easy remedy is to request 
the Prime Minister to terminate the mission. In addition to this, the region may bring the issue 
to the House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representative for a remedy.244 
 
ii) Procedure for intervention on the second ground 
Intervention based on the second ground is to be initiated by the HPR. Accordingly, when the 
House gets information about such situation, it may either send a team composed of its 
members to the region or may request for a joint session with the House of Federation (HF) 
to discuss the matter.245 When a team is sent to the region, a joint session will be made after 
                                                            
244 FDRE Constitution, Art.55 (17) & Art.62 (1). 
245 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.8 (1) & FDRE Constitution, Art.55 (16). 
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the report by the team is heard and only if the HPR considers that the situation warrants 
intervention.246 
 
The mandate of the team and contents of its report should be determined by law as the act of 
the team by itself is an intervention into a region. It has implications on the autonomy of the 
region. That is why, it seems, the mandate of the team is clearly specified under the federal 
law. The mandate of the team is to go to the region in which the alleged acts of human rights 
violations have occurred, gather information, prepare a report and submit the report to the 
HPR.247 The contents of the report are also regulated under the law. The report ‘shall specify 
concrete evidence that describes the act of the violations of human rights in the region, the 
sources of the problem and persons responsible for it, efforts made and measures taken by the 
region to arrest such violations of human rights and whether or not such region will be able to 
arrest the act.’248 
 
At this point, it is surprising to see two concepts. First, there is no any concept of team 
formation under the FDRE Constitution and also intervention by such team. This is the 
creation of the federal law. It is an intervention created by a subsidiary law and is as intrusive 
as the intervention that involves deploying Federal defence forces, for instance. Therefore, 
the constitutionality of such provision under the law is suspect. But it may be argued that all 
members of the HPR are not expected to examine the situation and practicality dictates team 
formation. Second, it is not up to the team to decide on whether the ‘Region will be able to 
arrest the act.’ The FDRE Constitution provides that intervention, which reasonably includes 
sending a team to investigate, must not be initiated before the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives has, at least, reasonable belief as to the inability of a region to arrest alleged 
human rights violations.249 
                                                            
246 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.10 (1). 
247 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.9 (1). 
248 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.9 (2). 
249 One may argue that the report is a recommendation. But it is a matter of fact that it greatly influences the 
decision of the House. 
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When there is a team involved, the joint meeting of the two federal houses will be made if 
and only if the HPR found intervention necessary. The latter House presents the issue 
together with the report and justifications for intervention and decision will be made after 
consideration of same.250 
 
As far as the measures to be taken are concerned, the law is not clear. It provides that the 
joint meeting of the two Houses will pass a decision and gives ‘directives to the region to 
arrest the acts of violations of human rights, and brings those who violated such human rights 
and take other measures as may be...necessary.’251 It simply authorizes the two Houses to 
decide upon the necessary measure on a case by case basis. Such measures may include 
deploying federal forces, ordering correction of policy directions that cause violation of 
human rights. 
 
Finally, the role of the Regional Government and the HPR, and termination of intervention 
are not dealt with under the law as far as intervention on the second ground is concerned. 
 
iii) Procedure of intervention on the third ground 
Intervention on the third ground is decided by the HF.252The House may intervene in two 
alternative ways. It may intervene by its own initiative or when it gets information on such 
act from any person, juridical or physical, including the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives.253 The House of Federation is empowered to seek for further investigation 
on any information it obtained concerning the act that endangers the constitutional order 
                                                            
250 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.10. 
 
251 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.11. 
252 FDRE Constitution, Art.62 (9). 
253 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (1). 
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committed in a region. If it believes there is a need for such investigation, it may order ‘the 
Council of Ministers or other government organs to investigate and report to it in order to 
decide whether there is danger.’254 The report is required to be capable of showing not only 
the existence of  danger to the constitutional order but also indicating ‘that the peaceful 
means to settle the causes...has been left out and the conditions’ that constitute the acts 
deemed to endanger the constitution existed.255 Based on the report, if any, the House of 
Federation may order federal intervention based on the findings of the report where it finds 
the situation warrants such intervention and is necessary to do so.256 The House is expected to 
make its decision not only on whether to intervene but also the type, level and timing of the 
intervention.257 
 
Finally, it is important to see that the Council of Ministers has been empowered by the 
federal law to carryout investigation in a region whenever it gets information about the 
commission of an act that endangers the constitutional order.258 This does not require an 
authorization from the HF as this is not stipulated under the FDRE Constitution. This puts a 
question mark on the constitutionality of the federal law. This act of investigation may not 
even be communicated to the HF. This is because the Council is not obliged to report about 
such investigations unless the Council concludes there is an act that endangers the 
constitutional order and intervention is necessary.259 This is clearly against the autonomy of 
the regions. It allows the Federal Government to act in a manner not provided under the 
Constitution. 
 
                                                            
254 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (1).  
255 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (3). 
256 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (4). 
257 Nahum 1997, 76. 
258 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (2). 
259 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (2).  
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Whenever the HF is convinced about the existence of the alleged act, constituting danger to 
the constitutional order, intervention will be ordered.260 The order must be clear about the 
nature and time of the measures to be taken by the Federal Government. The HF is provided 
with possible measures that might be taken. The principle, however, is that the measures must 
be capable of arresting ‘the situation that has endangered the constitutional order.’261 This 
principle is in line with the assumption that ‘federal intervention, if and when it comes, would 
be of a limited character and with specific goals, to avert the unfolding constitutional crisis’ 
as the autonomy of the regions should be preserved at all times and to be infringed to the least 
possible level only.262  The House may order the deployment of the Federal Police or the 
national defence force or both.263 The mission of these forces is to arrest the danger in the 
Region.264 Which force to deploy is determined based on the seriousness of the situation.265 
Included in the list of possible measures that can be taken by the House is the suspension of 
the Regional Council and the highest executive organ of the region and establishing a 
provisional regional administration directly accountable to the Federal Government.266 But, it 
is not clear whether these measures should be taken alternatively or cumulatively. No 
conjunction is used by the law, making it open for the debate whether the law allows for 
alternative or cumulative measure. This study holds that the measures are accumulative. The 
possibility of arresting the situation by deploying the Federal Police or the national defence 
force or both without suspending the Regional Council and the highest executive organ of the 
Region would be practically difficult. By the same token, suspension of the Regional Council 
and the highest executive organ of the region without the deployment of such forces is 
difficult as the Regional Police is likely to go out of business with the suspension of the 
regional executive. Consequently, the situation in the region will go from bad to worse unless 
the deployment of federal forces is coupled with a measure to suspend the Regional Council 
and the highest executive organ of the region. 
                                                            
260 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.13 (4). 
261 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (1). 
262 Nahum 1997, 75-76. 
263 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (2) (a). 
264 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (2) (a).  
265 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (2) (a). 
266 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (2) (b). 
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In relation to such kind of intervention, it is important to raise two issues. First, what is the 
mandate of federal forces and the provisional administration?  The mandate of the federal 
forces is to take any measures ‘proportionate to enable to arrest the situation that has 
endangered the Constitutional order.’267 The provisional administration has the following 
mandates: It has the power to ‘take measures that enable to arrest the situation that has 
endangered the constitutional order;’ ‘[t]o bring to justice the Regional Government officials, 
appointees, officials elected by the People, members of the police and security force, and 
other persons responsible for the danger of the constitutional order; [t]o speedily facilitate 
conditions for the regional Government to resume its office by restoring the constitutional 
order.’268 It also assumes all the powers and duties of the regional administration, and 
replaces the executive organ of the region.269 In principle, the Provincial Government is to 
stay in the region for not more than two years.270 Exceptionally, however, it may stay for 
additional six months.271 
 
Second, in case of such intervention, the HF has the power to follow up the intervention. The 
Prime Minister has to report to it every three months from the intervention or wherever 
requested by the HF.272 The HF also has the power to make its own independent evaluation 
                                                            
267 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (5). 
268 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.14 (3). 
269 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.15 (2). ‘[A]nd shall in particular; (a) lead and coordinate the executive organ; 
(b) assign the Heads of the Provisional Administration; (c) ensure the enforcement of law and order; (d) 
facilitate conditions for conducting election in the Region in accordance with relevant law; (e) approve a plan 
and budget of the Region; (f) carry out other duties to be entrusted to it by the Federal Government.’ 
Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.15 (2). 
270 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.15 (3). 
271 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.15 (3).  
272 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.16 (1) (2). 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
on the intervention and make the necessary directives to the Prime Minster.273 Furthermore, 
the HF and the Prime Minister are required to make the publication public.274 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The Federal Government of Ethiopia exercises supervisory power over the regions. It has 
been monitoring the regions pursuant to subsidiary legislations despite the absence of clear 
constitutional provision. It exercises its monitoring power through the different Ministries 
and Authorities. Therefore, it employs a sort of sectoral monitoring. In addition, the extent 
and manner of federal monitoring is not regulated by law. Whether federal monitoring should 
be implied from the intervention power is also not clear. Monitoring over exclusive regional 
matters is not clearly provided except in the case of implementation of federal land law and 
policies. 
 
As far as intervention is concerned, the FDRE Constitution uses the concept of intervention 
in a liberal manner. It uses it to signify interference of the Federal Government into regions 
regardless of the latter’s consent. Furthermore, the FDRE Constitution considers interference 
into concurrent powers by the Federal Government due to the failure of the regions to 
exercise such power as intervention. Finally, the rationales for intervention in Ethiopia could 
be taken to include assisting regions in case of security deterioration, and protecting human 
rights violations that can not be arrested by Regional Governments and the constitutional 
order.275 
 
 
                                                            
273 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.16 (3). 
274 Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.17. ‘1.The House of the Federation and the Prime Minster shall issue 
statements to the public about the situation that endangered the Constitutional order, the order given by the 
House of the Federation and current situation of the Region; 2. Without prejudice to Sub-Article (1) of this 
Article, a forum shall be held periodically to enable the public within the Region to have access to information 
about the situation and give opinions thereon. The public opinions expressed on such forum shall be compiled 
and submitted to the House of the Federation and the Council of Ministers.’ Proclamation No.359/2003, Art.17. 
275 See the discussion under Sections 3.2.3 & 4.2.3.2. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the discussion in the previous chapters, it is possible to see that; first, supervision 
consists in acts of monitoring and intervention. It is also an ‘on-going process.’ It may be 
devised for different reasons. Under the SA Constitution, it has been said that intervention is 
expressly provided for but monitoring is implied from the intervention power of the National 
Government.276 In Ethiopia too, the FDRE Constitution provides for intervention only. 
Whether monitoring is implied in this power or not has not been settled. The practice and 
subsidiary legislations, however, show that the Federal Government monitors regions. 
 
As far as monitoring with respect to matters for intervention explicitly provided under the 
FDRE Constitution, and implementation of federal land and environmental laws is 
concerned, it may be implied as such powers may not otherwise effectively exercised. For 
instance, intervention due to ‘human rights violations’ and ‘activities that endanger the 
constitutional order’ seems practically difficult without monitoring. In relation to such 
monitoring, the FDRE Constitution should address issues arising from such monitoring 
power, particularly who monitors and how should monitoring be made. With respect to 
monitoring in other areas is concerned, it lacks a constitutional basis. 
 
In addition, the scope of those implied monitoring is not determined. For instance, monitoring 
implementation of federal land laws may be regarded as monitoring of implementation of 
federal laws and policies. Monitoring, be it in the implementation of federal laws or policies, 
need to be regulated through specific laws as suggested in relation with South African legal 
system or elaborated provisions in the already existing laws through amendment. Therefore, 
it is commendable for Ethiopia to share such experience. This issue should not be left 
unaddressed as it compromises regions’ autonomy. The constitutional basis for laws 
authorizing monitoring should be assessed and remedied as it is otherwise be open to abuse. 
Furthermore, such monitoring, if constitutional, should be properly regulated. Entrenching 
                                                            
276 Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2.1. 
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the constitutional principle in this respect may be advisable at that would be stronger 
guarantee for regions’ autonomy as it can not be changed but through constitutional 
amendment.  Moreover, like said with respect to South African legal system, it is 
commendable for Ethiopia to set key indicators, and system of information collection, 
recording and analysis with regard to monitoring with a view to inform effective service 
delivery. 
 
Secondly, it is possible to see that the concept of intervention in the SA Constitution and the 
FDRE Constitution are different.277 To begin with, the former employs intervention in its 
strict sense, i.e. when there is a ‘unilateral interference of one sphere of government into the 
exclusive power areas of the other;’ whereas,   the latter uses intervention in more general 
sense, i.e. to both acts of unilateral interference and interference through the region’s 
consent.278 The latter focuses on the presence of any interference by the Federal Government 
into Regions regardless of the will of the latter. In addition, it does not limit intervention into 
interference into exclusive areas of Regions. It applies the concept to interference into areas 
of concurrent powers too. 
 
Moreover, the SA Constitution allows national intervention only where there is failure on to 
fulfil any ‘executive obligations’;279 whereas, the FDRE Constitution allows intervention 
only in limited instance. It allows intervention only in case of ‘deteriorating security 
situation’ in regions and such situation can not be arrested by the Regional Governments, 
where there is a ‘threat that endangers the constitutional order,’ and  where there is ‘human 
rights violations’ in regions and the Regional Governments are unable to arrest such 
violations.280 This writer recommends for inclusion of intervention in case of region’s failure 
to fulfil ‘executive obligations’ in order to realise equal development of regions, which is one 
                                                            
277 Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2 & Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3. 
278 The same as above. 
279 Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2.2, (i). 
280 Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3.2, (i) (ii) & (iii). 
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of the rationales of federalism in Ethiopia,281 as supervision is one of the acceptable tools to 
overcome unequal development of sub-national states. In addition, supervision of fulfilment 
of executive responsibilities may help in the realisation of one of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the FDRE Constitution, i.e. equal access to public service by 
Nation, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia.282 In the absence of supervision in respect to 
executive obligation, it seems difficult to provide public service in regions and this would 
deprive people of their rights. Moreover, supervision is required to improve service delivery 
and effective or ‘responsive’ governance, which are among the reasons of federalism in 
Ethiopia.283 
 
In addition, the SA Constitution governs not only substantive but also procedural aspects of 
national intervention.284 Hence, it lifts procedure of intervention up to constitutional level. 
The FDRE Constitution, on the other hand, neither regulates the procedure of intervention 
particularly in respect of intervention due to ‘human rights violations’ or ‘activities 
endangering the constitutional order’ in regions nor authorizes determination of same by 
subsidiary laws. However, the Federal Government has promulgated a law that regulates the 
system of intervention enshrined under the FDRE Constitution.285 
 
Furthermore, the FDRE Constitution obliges the Federal Government of Ethiopia to ensure 
devolution of government power to the lowest tier of government in order to bring 
governance near to the people.286 The relevant bodies in Ethiopia should address the issue 
how would the Federal Government ensures the devolution of power to the lowest tier of 
government. The Federal Government is engaged in act of monitoring Regional Governments 
with respect to such devolution efforts. But, there is no law governing how such supervision 
                                                            
281 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Capacity Building (MCB) 2005, 21-22. 
282 FDRE Constitution, Article 41 (3) (4). 
283 MCB 2005, 21-22. 
284 Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2.2, (ii). 
285 Proclamation No.359/2003. 
286 FDRE Constitution, Art.50 (4). 
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should be made. Therefore, legislation on this matter is required to establish clear rules for 
the Federal Government and protect autonomy of Regional Governments. 
 
In addition, the FDRE Constitution provides for supervision with respect to subsidies to 
developing regions.287 But the supervision is carried out by regions themselves.288 The 
constitutionality of this practice is disputable. This writer believes that the FDRE 
Constitution authorizes the Federal Government, not regions, to supervise use of such 
subsidies. It does not also accord to the meaning of supervision, which is an act of monitoring 
of and intervention into regions by the Federal Government. 
 
Finally, intervention strategies of the SA Constitution and FDRE Constitution differ. At least 
theoretically, the Ethiopian system reflects more federal system. The South African system 
gives a wider room for supervision of province by the National Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
287 FDRE Constitution, Art.94 (2). 
288 The same as above. 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Bibliography 
I- Books, Chapters in Books and Articles 
1- Aalen L (2002) Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian 
Experience 1991-2000, Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human 
Rights. 
2- Ayenew, M. (2002), ‘Decentralization in Ethiopia: Two Case Studies on Devolution 
of Power and Responsibilities to Local Government Authorities’ in Ethiopia: The 
Challenge of Democracy from Below,  Zewde B. and Pausewang S (eds), Uppsala: 
Nordic Africa Institute. 
3- Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Cambridge University Press 2003. 
4- Chaskalson, M. & Klaaren, J. (1999), ‘National Government,’ in Constitutional Law 
of South Africa, Chaskalson, M.  et’al (eds),  Wetton: Juta.  
5- De Visser, J. (2005), Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa, 
Antrewep: Intersentia. 
6- Elazar, D. (1995), Federalism: An overview, in Federalism Theory & application, 
Vol.1, De Villiers, B, (ed.), Pretoria: HSRC Press Publishers.  
7- Hessel, B. (2006),  ‘European integration and the supervision of local and regional 
authorities Experiences in the Netherlands with requirements of European 
Community law,’ Utrecht Law Review,  Vol.2, Issue 1.  
8- Madlingozi, T & Woolman, S (2007), ‘Provincial Legislative Authority,’ in   
Constitutional Law of South Africa, Woolman, S. et’al (eds), 2nd ed., Cape Town: Juta 
& Co LTD. 
9- Malan, L. (2005), ‘Intergovernmental relations and co-operative government in South 
Africa: the ten-year review,’ Politeia, Vol. 24 No 2. 
10- Morrison, S. (1992), ‘Ethiopia charts a new course,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol.3 
No.3.  
11- Murray, C. (1999), ‘Municipal integrity and effective government: the Butterworth 
intervention,’ SAPR/PL, Vol.14. 
12- Murray, C. & Ampofo-Anti, O. (2007), ‘Provincial Executive Authority,’ in 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Constitutional Law of South Africa, Woolman, S. et’al (eds), 2nd ed., Cape Town: Juta 
& Co LTD. 
13- Nahum, F. (1997), Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect, 
Asmara: The Red Sea Press, Inc. 
14- Simeon, R. & Murray, C. (2004) “Multi-level governance in South Africa” in 
Ethnicity & democracy in Africa, Berman, B. et’al (eds), James Currey Publishers. 
15- Steytler, N. (2001) ‘Concurrency and co-operative government: The law and practice 
in South Africa,’  SAPR/PL, Vol.16. 
16- Steytler, N. (1999) ‘South Africa,’ in Federalism and Civil Societies, Kramer Jutta 
and Schneider Hans-Peter (eds), Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos. 
17- Tapscott, C. (2000), ‘Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: The Challenges of 
Co-operative Government,’ Public Administration and Development 20, 119-128.  
18- Thompson, F. (1991), ‘Management control and the Pentagon: The organizational 
strategy-structure mismatch,’ Public Administration Review, Vol.51, No.1. 
19- Watts, R (2001), ‘Intergovernmental relations: Conceptual issues’ in 
Intergovernmental relations in South Africa: Challenges of co-operative government, 
Levy, N & Tapscott, C (eds), Cape Town, SA: IDASA and School of Government 
(University of the Western Cape Publishing).  
20- Woolman, S. et’al (2007) ‘Co-operative Government,’ in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa, Woolman, S. et’al (eds), 2nd ed., Cape Town: Juta & Co LTD. 
II- Laws 
1- Proclamation to provide for the definitions of powers and duties of the executive 
organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No.471/ 2005, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 12th Year No.1.  
2- Proclamation to provide for the establishment of environmental protection organs, 
Proclamation No.295/2002, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No.7.  
3- Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter, Proclamation No.361/2003, Federal 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No. 86. 
4- Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, Proclamation 
No.1/1995, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 1st Year No.1. 
5- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996. 
6- Dire Dawa Administration Charter, Proclamation No.416/2004, Federal Negarit 
Gazeta, 10th Year No. 60.  
7- Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation, Proclamation No.300/2000, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No.12. 
8- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration Proclamation, 
Proclamation No.456/2005, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 11th Year No.44. 
9- General Notice 947 of 2001, National Treasury General Notice, Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Province 
of Mpumalanga in terms of Section 100 of the Constitution. 
10- Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 13 of 2005. 
11- System for the intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions, Proclamation 
No.359/2003, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No.80. 
III- Cases 
1- In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) 
BCLR 1253 (CC). 
2- Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA and Others 1999 
(4) BCLR 382 (CC).  
IV- Internet Sources and Others 
 
1- Baldi B., Beyond the Federal-Unitary Dichotomy, p. 4, available at 
http://igs.berkeley.edu/publications/working_papers/99-7.pdf accessed on 30/05/2008.   
2- Cohen, J. (1994), ‘Transition toward Democracy and Governance in Post Mengistu 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Ethiopia,’ Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University 
Development Discussion Paper no. 493, available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/493.pdf, accessed on 17/11/2008. 
3- De Visser, J. (1999), A legal analyis [sic] of provincial intervention in a municipality, 
1999, available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/local-
government/publications02/supervision-of-
municipalities/thesisjdv.pdf/?searchterm=chapter%20one accessed on 10/06/2008. 
4- DPLG (2006), Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act Evolution and Practice.  
5- DPLG (2007), Practitioner’s guide to intergovernmental relations in South Africa, 
2007, available at 
http://www.thedplg.gov.za/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=17
1, accessed on 09/05/2008. 
6- DPLG (1999), The intergovernmental relations audit: Towards a culture of co-
operative government.   
7- Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Capacity Building, District 
Level Decentralisation Program (MCB) (2005), Program Document, unpublished. 
8- Federal Ministry of Health, Health Management Information System (HIMS) Reform 
Team (2008), HMIS/ Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Information Use Guidelines 
and Display Tools HMIS / M&E Technical Standards: Area 4,  2008, available at the 
Federal Ministry of Health. 
9- Federal Ministry of Health, Planning and Programming Department (2005), Health 
Sector Strategic Plan, (HSDP- III), 2005/6- 2009/10, available at 
http://www.etharc.org/publications/moh/healthstrategicplan_2005.pdf 03, accessed on 
10/09/2008. 
10- Federal Ministry of Health (2007), The Health Sector Development Program (HSDP) 
Harmonization Manual (HHM), First Edition, available at the Federal Ministry of 
Health. 
11- The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: The House of Federation (2007), The 
new federal budget grant distribution formula, p.2, 
http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/Budget%20Grant%20to%20the%20Regional%20Stat
 
 
 
 
62 
 
e.pdf, accessed on 01/06/2008.  
12- Fesseha, Y. and Steytler N. (2006), Provincial Intergovernmental forums: A post-
Intergovernmental relations Framework Act compliance assessment, Community Law 
Centre, University of the Western Cape, available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/local-government/publications02/co-
operative-government-and-local-government/copy_of_premiers-intergovernmental-
forums.pdf/attachment_download/file accessed on 10/08/08.  
13- Habib, M., The Role and Function of the House of the Federation under the Ethiopian 
Constitution, 
http://www.hofethiopia.org/pdf/The%20role%20of%20the%20House%20in%20EFD
RE%20constition.pdf, accessed on 19/05/08. 
14- Interview with Ato Assefa Deme, Ministry of Capacity Building, District Level 
Decentralization Expert, on 01/06/08. 
15- Miller, K. (2002), Advantages and disadvantages of local government 
decentralization, a paper presented at  Caribbean conference on local government and 
decentralisation, Georgetown, Guyana, June 25-28, available at  
http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/lac/guyana/localgov_conf/materials/papers/miller_doc.
pdf, accessed on 27/06/08. 
16- Monitoring and evaluation, p.3, available at 
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:ZaYKxNdlJAcJ:www.civicus.org/new/media/Mo
nitoring%2520and%2520Evaluation.pdf+Monitoring&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=za 
accessed on 28/07/08. 
17- Nyiri Z. Decentralization and good governance: Ten years of Hungarian experience, 
available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005561.pd
f accessed on 28/07/08. 
18- Roberts, E. The financial relationship between national and provincial governments in 
South Africa available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310799 
accessed on 08/11/08. 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
19- ... ‘SPEECH BY MINISTER MUFAMADI ON THE OCCASION OF BUDGET 
VOTE NO 22, DEPARTMENT OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 
National Council of Provinces, 13 June 2000’ available at 
http://www.search.gov.za/info/previewDocument.jsp?dk=%2Fdata%2Fstatic%2Finfo
%2Fspeeches%2F2000%2F000614355p1004.htm%40SpeechesandStatements&q=%3
Cphrase%3E+(issued+by%3A+department+of+provincial)+%3CAND%3E(+Categor
y%3Cmatches%3Es+)&t=MUFAMADI%3A+PROVINCIAL+AND+LOCAL+GOV
ERNMENT+BUDGET+VOTE+2000%2F2001%2C+NCOP accessed on 09/08/08.  
20- Serra-Horguelin, A. The federal experiment in Ethiopia: A socio-political analysis, 
available at http://www.cean.sciencespobordeaux.fr/page%20perso/TD64.pdf 
accessed on 10/09/08. 
21- Steinich, M. (2000) Monitoring and Evaluating Support to Decentralisation: 
Challenges and Dilemmas, A paper prepared for a Seminar on "European Support for 
Democratic Decentralisation and Municipal Development - A Contribution to Local 
Development and Poverty Reduction," held in Maastricht, 14-15 June 2000 available 
at http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/00-1236.pdf accessed on 28/08/08. 
22- Steytler N. (c), The Republic of South Africa, available at     
http://www.federalism.ch/files/categories/IntensivkursII/southAfricag1.pdf, accessed 
on  29/06/2008.  
23- Tapscott, C. (2000) (b) ‘Intergovernmental relations in South Africa: The challenges 
of co-operative government,’ Governance in South Africa: An Occasional Paper 
Series, School of Government, University of the Western Cape.  
24- What is evaluation? available at  http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/index.cfm?pg=167 
accessed on 29/06/2008. 
25- What is Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)? available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/ecd/what_is_me.html accessed on 02/09/08. 
26- What is monitoring? available at  http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/index.cfm?pg=166 
accessed on 29/08/08. 
27- Work, R. Overview of decentralisation worldwide: A stepping stone to improved 
governance and human development available at 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/DLGUD_Pub_overview-decentralisation-
worldwide-paper.pdf, accessed on 03/10/08. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
